The European Union in the OSCE in the Light of the Ukrainian Crisis: Trading Actorness for Effectiveness? EU Diplomacy Paper 03/2016 by Šimáková, Michaela Anna
DEPARTMENT OF EU INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY STUDIES
The European Union in 
the OSCE in the Light of the 
Ukrainian Crisis: Trading 
Actorness for Effectiveness?
Michaela Anna Šimáková
EU Diplomacy Paper 03 / 2016
  
Department of EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
EU Diplomacy Papers 
3/2016 
 
 
 
 
 
The European Union in the OSCE in the Light of 
the Ukrainian Crisis: Trading Actorness for 
Effectiveness? 
 
Michaela Anna ŠIMÁKOVÁ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Michaela Anna Šimáková 
 
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird 
EU Diplomacy Paper 3/2016 
2 
About the Author 
 
Michaela Anna Šimáková is Academic Assistant at the College of Europe in Bruges, 
Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies. She holds an MA in 
EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies from the College of Europe and an 
MA in International Security from SciencesPo Paris (PSIA). She worked for the Slovak 
Foreign Policy Association and carried out traineeships at the Slovak Ministry of 
Defence and at the EU Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna. She 
also worked for the Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council and its Delegation to the 
International Organisations in Vienna and has contributed to the Fostering Human 
Rights Among European Policies (FRAME) Report on EU engagement with other 
European regional organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Team: 
Nicola Del Medico, Tommaso Emiliani, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Ludovic Highman, Sara 
Hurtekant, Enrique Ibáñez, Simon Schunz, Michaela Šimáková 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail ird.info@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Views expressed in the EU Diplomacy Papers are those of the authors only and do 
not necessarily reflect positions of either the series editors or the College of Europe. 
Michaela Anna Šimáková 
 
Abstract  
 
The ‘conflict in and around Ukraine’ has since its outburst in 2013-14 been one of the 
major challenges for the European Union (EU) and its foreign policy. While the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has experienced 
revival and played a key role in the management of the crisis, the EU has stayed 
mostly aside, being considered as part of the problem rather than the solution. This 
understanding stems from the collision between Ukraine’s European aspirations and 
Russia’s ‘core interests’ in the post-Soviet space. As the OSCE took the ownership 
over the crisis response, one of the important interfaces of the EU’s indirect 
involvement has been its representation in the OSCE. From this perspective, the main 
analytical question that this paper addresses is how efficient the EU has been as an 
actor in advancing its goals related to the conflict through and within the OSCE. This 
paper thus aims to shed light on the relation between EU actorness and effectiveness 
in a crisis context. It argues that stronger actorness does not necessarily generate 
more EU effectiveness, or ability to influence outcomes, in the specific setting of a 
crisis and taking into account the external opportunity structure. The paper finds that 
in the case of Ukraine and the OSCE greater flexibility in the division of labour 
between the EU and its member states in external representation enabled a greater 
effectiveness in crisis response through the OSCE platform. By being pragmatic about 
its external representation, the EU has successfully ‘traded its actorness for 
effectiveness’ in the Ukrainian crisis context. 
 
 
EU Diplomacy Paper 3/2016 
4 
Introduction: Why the OSCE matters for the EU 
 
The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and subsequently 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), used to be at the 
heart of the European security dialogue. On the basis of the so-called Helsinki 
Process, the CSCE/OSCE became the backbone of the Eurasian security 
architecture since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, during the détente 
phase of the Cold War. This was sealed with the decision of the Budapest Summit in 
December 1994 on the creation of the OSCE in 1995. Since then, “the OSCE has 
developed and implemented a broad and multidimensional concept of security, 
focused on negotiations and consensus-making activities, and adapted to various 
changing circumstances”.1 
 
Yet, the Organisation soon after the Cold War became “Europe's Forgotten Security 
Organization”. 2  Moreover, being consensus-based, the OSCE’s capacity to act 
diminished also internally with the emerging heterogeneity of the interests of the 
participating States, but also as a consequence of “Russian obstructionist policies”3 
and American ambivalence. As for the EU, paradoxically, according to Dominguez,4 
Larivé 5 as well as van Willigen 6 and others, the Union itself has contributed, for 
different reasons, to the decrease of the interest in and importance of the OSCE, 
despite its commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’. 
 
Nevertheless, if one assumes that the overarching reason for the OSCE’s absence 
until 2013 is the end of the Cold War, then the increased tensions between Russia 
and the West, which some observers refer to as the ‘new Cold War’,7 might stimulate 
the OSCE’s revival. Russia’s genuine participation is increasingly inevitable for 
regional stability, in line with the principle of comprehensive and cooperative 
                                                 
1 R. Dominguez (ed.), The OSCE: Soft Security for a Hard World: Competing Theories for 
Understanding the OSCE, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2014, p. 17. 
2 C.J. Morrow & M. Mitchell, “Europe's Forgotten Security Organization”, World Policy Blog, 
May 28, 2014, retrieved 1/04/15, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/05/28/europes-
forgotten-security-organization. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Dominguez, op.cit., p.17. 
5 M. Larivé, “The European Architecture: OSCE, NATO and the EU”, in R. Dominguez (ed.), The 
OSCE: Soft Security for a Hard World, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A, 2014, pp. 173-174. 
6 N. van Willigen, “Effective Multilateralism between Unequal Partners: The EU in the OSCE”, in 
E. Drieskens & L. G. Van Schaik (eds.), The EU and Effective Multilateralism: Internal and 
External Reform Practices, London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 136-152. 
7 R. Legvold, “Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and Washington Can Learn from 
the Last One”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, retrieved 5/2/15, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141537/robert-legvold/managing-the-new-cold-war. 
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security, as defined in the OSCE documents.8 The Ukrainian crisis confirms one of the 
key premises of the OSCE: Euro-Atlantic security has been and remains indivisible9 
given that “the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all 
the others”. 10  The geostrategic environment in Europe is clearly changing and 
dividing lines appear to be re-emerging. Yet, at the same time, these worrying 
developments can entail the revitalisation of the OSCE’s importance and role as 
bridge-builder, ‘fairest’ broker as well as institutionalised security provider. Clearly, “in 
terms of balancing a relationship between Russia and the West, the OSCE has a 
distinct advantage over NATO and the EU because of its historical ability to create 
dialogue between the two sides”.11 
 
The EU has been one of the key stakeholders in the Ukrainian crisis since its outburst in 
2013. However, at the same time, it is somehow absent, a priori for political reasons, 
from the main formats addressing the crisis in Ukraine. The OSCE, on the other hand, 
has been directly involved in the crisis response, and that is why interactions 
between the two entities and within the OSCE since 2013 are the core of this paper. 
The importance of analysing the EU’s functioning within the OSCE is accentuated by 
the immediate and significant impacts of the crisis on European security, as the 
escalation in the form of numerous military exercises, capacity-building activities and 
declarations on the both sides testify to.12 More precisely, the paper focuses on the 
EU Delegation, its role and presence within the OSCE in the context of the Ukrainian 
crisis. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Union became preoccupied 
with upgrading its status in multilateral fora, insisting on the ‘single’ or ‘one voice’ 
principle when delivering EU statements. In a regional organisation, like the OSCE, this 
implies a majority block of 28 member states plus a list of aligned countries, which 
may generate unexpected dynamics of bipolarity and risks creating deadlock.  
 
The objective of this study is to deepen the understanding of the EU’s representation 
in the Organisation, by applying the concept of actorness and linking it to the 
                                                 
8  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, The OSCE Concept of 
Comprehensive and Co-operative Security: An Overview of Major Milestones, Vienna, OSCE 
Secretariat Conflict Prevention Centre Operations Service, June 2009, pp. 3-14. 
9 M.P. de Brichambaut, former Secretary General of the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, “The Indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic Security”, speech, 18th Partnership for 
Peace Research Seminar, Vienna Diplomatic Academy, 4 February 2010. 
10 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted at the Second CSCE Summit of Heads of State 
or Government, Paris, 19 - 21 November 1990. 
11 Morrow & Mitchell, op.cit. 
12 See, for instance, NATO, Statement by NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu on misleading 
and incorrect Russian statements, 16 April 2015, retrieved 16/04/15, http://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natohq/news_118761.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
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question of the EU’s performance or rather effectiveness, that is, its ability to 
influence outcomes of international processes. To what extent does the EU pursue 
the status of a unitary key actor and how does this impact its performance within the 
OSCE? Does the EU continue to strive to effectively enhance its involvement in the 
OSCE and to increase the support for the OSCE assignment to deescalate the 
Ukrainian crisis?  
 
It will be argued that despite the EU’s increased interest in the OSCE and a relatively 
improved EU actorness within the Organisation, the EU’s ability to autonomously 
influence the situation around the Ukrainian crisis has been rather limited. The EU’s 
ability to act autonomously has been constrained not only by the external 
opportunity structure, such as the politicisation of the crisis and OSCE internal set-up, 
but also as a result of EU internal factors, such as interests of individual EU member 
states. These variables not only underline the limits of EU actorness in a major crisis 
context, in which it is a stakeholder, but also of the intuitive belief that EU actorness 
and effectiveness are a priori positively correlated. 
 
The remainder of this introduction outlines the theoretical foundations of the paper. 
Throughout the second part the conceptual framework is confronted with practical 
data. Finally, the concluding part deals with the findings on the EU’s effective 
presence and specific agency within the OSCE in the light of the Ukrainian crisis. 
 
Analytical framework 
 
Embracing the notion of ‘effective multilateralism’ as stipulated in the European 
Security Strategy,13 the EU could be regarded as a “negotiated multilateral order”, 
intersecting with the multilateral order embodied by the OSCE. 14 Seen from this 
perspective, the EU shall pursue a specific “modality of going international”,15 which 
involves not only EU interactions, but also those of the member states, ranging from 
complementary to adversary.  
 
                                                 
13 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
14  S. Blavoukos & D. Baurantonis, “Introduction: The EU Presence in International 
Organizations”, in S. Blavoukos & D. Bourantonis (eds.), The EU Presence in International 
Organizations, London, Routledge, 2010, p. 1. 
15 S. Biscop, “Odd Couple or Dynamic Duo? The EU and Strategy in Times of Crisis”, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 15, no. 3, 2009, p. 13. 
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In spite of the Lisbon Treaty objectives of increased coherence and consistency in EU 
foreign policy, there is no single method of EU policy-making 16  and the EU’s 
“international ‘presence’ is not limited to the EU collective actions”.17 In practice, the 
EU spends a considerable amount of time on internal coordination and consensus 
building among its member states, which yet leaves the EU a little flexibility in terms of 
interacting with other actors beyond the agreed language. Furthermore, such 
“rigidity does not bode well with core assumptions of multilateralism that 
presupposes some degree of flexibility”.18 
 
All in all, both endogenous and exogenous variables matter when the Union’s 
functioning in multilateral settings is to be seized properly.19 The paper pays attention 
not only to these internal dynamics among the EU and its member states – the 
internal opportunity structure – in the critical context of the Ukrainian crisis’, but also 
considers more in detail the external opportunity structure.20  
 
The EU, an actor per se? 
 
Based on the idea of a context as a dynamic process,21 the external opportunity 
structure “denotes the external environment of ideas and events – the context which 
frames and shapes EU action or inaction”.22 The focus in this regard is on the major 
structural elements that have potentially the greatest impact on the EU’s actorness 
and effectiveness, for instance the politicisation of the Ukrainian crisis.  
 
However, to assume that the external environment and its exogenous parameters 
pre-condition the internal dynamics of EU actorness would be a sloppy undertaking 
since the internal structures, the processes in the OSCE and the ‘mixed’ 
representation (that is, member states and the EU) are well-established, durable and 
of relevant significance. Both, endogenous and exogenous factors have an impact 
and influence the EU’s presence and interactions within international organisations.  
 
                                                 
16 L.G. van Schaik, EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More than the Sum 
of its Parts?, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 1. 
17 Blavoukos & Baurantonis, op.cit., p. 4 [emphasis added]. 
18 Council of The European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, op.cit. 
19 K.V. Laatikainen & K.E. Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting 
Multilateralisms, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
20 Niemann & Bretherton, op.cit., p. 264. 
21 Ibid., p. 266. 
22 C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, The European Union as Global Actor, New York, Routledge, 2006, 
2nd edition, p. 24. 
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Building upon the original definition developed by Sjöstedt, actorness is understood 
as the ability to function “actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the 
international system”. 23  The tendency towards this characteristic appeared in 
practice, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in the form of EU efforts to 
upgrade its status in different international organisations.24  
 
In the spirit of the Treaties, the EU has been seeking not only a formal recognition, but 
also formal rights as a distinctive, sui generis entity in different international fora. 
However, the initial euphoria has evaporated with the unexpected difficulties and 
the tremendous resources that were required in order to achieve a positive voting on 
a resolution (A/RES/65/276)25 on the participation of the EU in the work of the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) in 2011. Yet, external recognition can go beyond a formal 
acknowledgement and can stem simply from the fact that the EU controls resources 
and can contribute separately from its member states.26  
 
In practice, the Union has gradually adopted a more pragmatic and creative 
attitude in this regard, as its OSCE presence shows. Since the EU does not presently 
have any formal status in the OSCE, it acts as a part of the EU rotating Presidency’s 
Delegation.27 The paper considers also this internal set-up as an appropriate element 
in relation to the four EU actorness criteria as defined by Jupille and Caporaso.28 
Furthermore, the EU and its member states devote considerable resources to the 
OSCE and, hence, the question is whether the EU is not only a ‘payer’ but also a 
‘player’.29 
 
The EU’s external representation: actorness vs. effectiveness? 
 
                                                 
23 G. Sjo ̈stedt, “The External Role of the European Community”, Saxon House, Swedish Institute 
of International Affairs, 1977, p. 16. 
24  E. Drieskens, “Introduction. A framework for analysing effective multilateralism”, in E. 
Drieskens & L.G. Van Schaik (eds.), The EU and Effective Multilateralism: Internal and external 
Reform Practices, London York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 2-3. 
25 United Nations General Assembly, Participation of the European Union in the work of the 
United Nations, A/65/276 of 3 May 2011, retrieved 1/8/2016, http://www.un.org/ 
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/276. 
26 Gehring, Oberthür & Mühleck, op.cit., pp. 849-865. 
27  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Rules of Procedure of the 
Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 2006, pp. 8, 10, retrieved 1/8/2016, 
http://MC.DOC/1/06. 
28 Jupille & Caporaso, op.cit., pp. 213-229. 
29 E.J. Kirchner, “EU Contribution to and Cooperation with Multilateral Organizations”, in S. 
Blavoukos & D. Bourantonis (eds.), The EU Presence in International Organizations, London, 
Routledge, 2010, pp. 16-33. 
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The existing literature is not united on a term that would capture and qualify the 
Union’s being, functioning and potential in multilateral settings and, more precisely, 
the nature of its external representation. 30  The fairly complex concept of EU 
actorness reflects the patchy nature of EU international capabilities31 and is based 
on four criteria. These criteria − recognition, authority, cohesion and autonomy32 − 
aim to encapsulate the extent of “the EU’s possibility to function actively and 
deliberately in international politics”.33 
 
Recognition stems from a formal and informal acceptance of the EU as an actor 
that is more than the sum of its parts,34 internally by its member states, and externally 
by third states as well as by and within an organisation. Authority is primarily 
associated with the legal competence to act in a given context, but it can be also 
extended to an informal authority,35 based on an acquired know-how or through 
significant expertise.36 Cohesion designates the degree to which the EU “is able to 
formulate and articulate internally consistent policy preferences”.37 Finally, autonomy 
is a behavioural criterion of the EU’s institutional distinctiveness and, hence, it can be 
understood as a degree of independence from other actors. Lastly, from a social 
constructivist angle, this is also the point where ideational forces38 and “perceptions 
of actorness can feed back to actual actorness”.39 
 
The effectiveness of EU action or ‘problem-solving’ is usually defined as the ability of 
the EU to accomplish its stated goals. It is also “notoriously difficult to analyse and 
assess”,40 which this paper takes into account. Moreover, as Kirchner emphasises, 
caution is called for in “equating increased activities with effectiveness”.41 Also, in 
                                                 
30 Van Schaik, op.cit., p. 7. 
31 L. Groen & A. Niemann, “EU Actorness and Effectiveness under Political Pressure at the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Negotiations”, paper presented at the Twelfth European 
Union Studies Association Conference Boston, Massachusetts, 3-5 March 2011, p. 5. 
32 Jupille & Caporaso, op.cit. 
33 Groen & Niemann, op.cit., p. 5. 
34  K. Čmakalová & J.M. Rolenc, “Actorness and Legitimacy of the European Union”, 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 47, no. 2, 2012, p. 260. 
35 Informal recognition can be also associated with the notion of legitimacy (based on 
knowledge, capabilities or expertise), when the EU is recognised on the basis of being a 
legitimate actor in a given context. 
36 Niemann & Bretherton, op.cit., p. 265. 
37 M.L.P. Groenleer & L.G. Van Schaik, “United We Stand? The European Union’s International 
Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 45, no. 5, 2007, p. 972. 
38 R.H. Ginsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 37, no. 3, 1999, p. 435. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Niemann & Bretherton, op.cit., p. 267. 
41 Kirchner, op.cit., p. 21. 
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the context of crisis, where the EU is one of the parts of the ‘Ukrainian crisis puzzle’, its 
effectiveness should be better understood as an ability to shape and influence the 
relevant processes in its favour.  
 
Likewise, when it comes to effectiveness of EU action in the world, there are two 
distinct lines of thinking. On the one hand, there is a conviction that the more the EU 
is united, the more effective it could be and vice versa. This perspective, spread 
mostly among high-level EU officials and practitioners, 42  favours more 
supranationalism and EU competences in foreign policy. On the other hand, a 
number of scholars questioned whether EU unity or strong actorness automatically 
lead to EU effectiveness in achieving its goals or influencing multilateral processes.43  
 
Indeed, the relationship between EU actorness and effectiveness, or EU actorness-
effectiveness dynamics, is “often under-specified and systematic empirical analysis 
of EU effectiveness are still relatively rare”.44 In addition, if we look at the politically 
plausible concept of an EU ‘speaking with one voice’, from an outside perspective, 
such an entity is taken more seriously. In turn, a more united EU potentially leads to a 
greater resistance from other actors. Seen from a practitioner’s angle, the situation is 
nuanced also internally, as Herman Van Rompuy shared his insights during a seminar 
at College of Europe: “[O]ne voice is a dream […] if there is one message it is 
already good”.45 That said, there are possibly negative effects of an enhanced EU 
actorness.46 The OSCE environment, revived by the Ukrainian crisis, is a relevant case 
for the study of an EU ‘bloc approach’ as other main stakeholders, that is, Russia and 
the USA, sit at the table.  
 
The following section outlines the EU-OSCE framework and functioning of the EU 
Delegation and EU member states in the OSCE, the EU performance since 2014 and 
the EU’s ability to act as a unitary actor when dealing with the Ukrainian crisis in the 
OSCE context.  
 
                                                 
42 D.C. Thomas, “Still Punching below its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European 
Union Foreign Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 457-458. 
43 For instance Niemann, Bretherton, op.cit., p. 268; Van Schaik, op.cit; Thomas, op.cit., pp. 
457-474. 
M. Carbone, “Between EU Actorness and Aid Effectiveness: The Logics of EU Aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa”, International Relations, vol. 27, no. 3, 2013, pp. 341-355. 
44 Niemann & Bretherton, op.cit., p. 263. 
45 H. Van Rompuy, former President of the European Council (2009-2014), “Leadership et prise 
de décisions dans l’Union européenne”, compact seminar, College of Europe, Bruges, 27 
April 2015. 
46 Van Schaik, op.cit., p. 4. 
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Tracing EU actorness-effectiveness dynamics in the OSCE 
 
In what kind of environment has the EU’s external representation in the OSCE been 
operating and representing EU interests since the adoption and entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty? All 28 EU member states as well as non-EU partner countries in the 
region are OSCE participating States. The EU and a ‘pro-EU bloc’ have grown with 
different waves of EU enlargements and EU external policies. Moreover, its “collective 
weight inside the OSCE increased, also because the US and Russia have both given 
the OSCE the cold shoulder”.47 
 
Similarly, the EU-OSCE power-balance in political, legal and economic terms 48 
changed in favour of the EU since the 1990s. At the same time, “the fact that the EU 
has managed to grow so fast, physically and in competence, within a continent 
essentially at peace is part of the CSCE/OSCE achievement”.49 The Union has given 
a clear priority to the OSCE human dimension, which has been criticised by the 
participating States ‘East of Vienna’, hinting at the double-standards bias of the 
West, applying divergent principles to supposedly equal partners. Those deadlocks, 
the lack of US interest, together with the necessity to reaffirm the existing 
commitments that have not been implemented, has been fuelling scepticism, but 
also gave an impetus to a so-called ‘Helsinki+40’ process. This initiative could be 
grasped as an endeavour to resolve the institutional paralysis, political stalemate 
within the OSCE in view of revitalising the Organisation. 
 
Even though the Union is a more powerful regional actor, the conflict ‘in and around 
Ukraine’ suggests that the OSCE still has a lot to teach the EU whose recurrent 
challenge is to “curb its youthful impetuousness and occasional brashness in the 
security field: to learn the skills of listening and watching, as well as talking and 
doing”50. Despite the lack of EU interest in the OSCE, due to overlap51 between the 
two institutions in terms of mission and goals, a great number of interfaces exists. The 
existing inter-institutional framework draws on a historical legacy given that the 
European Community “was involved in the CSCE from beginning […] as negotiator 
                                                 
47 P. van Ham, “EU-OSCE: Partners or Rivals in Security?”, in K.E. Jørgensen (ed.), The European 
Union and International Organizations, London, Routledge, pp. 145-146. 
48 The OSCE has not got a legal personality and when it comes to its ‘Unified Budget’ the zero-
growth policy at the best has been since several years applied. 
49 A.J.K. Bailes, J.-Y. Haine & Z. Lachowski, “Reflections on the EU-OSCE Relationship”, OSCE 
Yearbook 2007, Baden Baden, Nomos, p. 76. 
50 Bailes, Haine & Lachowski, op.cit., p. 76. 
51 Van Willigen, op.cit., p. 136. 
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and signatory of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975”.52 There are regular contacts between 
officials on the highest level (e.g. EU-OSCE meetings, between the OSCE Secretary-
General and the Commission53) and similarly, on the occasion of the annual OSCE 
Ministerial Council (MC). Interestingly, whilst in 2013 the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission 
(HR/VP) Ashton’s participation at the OSCE MC was not confirmed till the very last 
moment and finally, the EU was represented by Helga Schmid, Deputy Secretary 
General of the European External Action Service (that is, at the political director 
level), the new HR/VP Mogherini decided to attend the OSCE MC in Basel under the 
Swiss Chairmanship-in-Office (CiO). The fact that Swiss Chairman-in-Office, Didier 
Burkhalter, participated in the Foreign Affairs Council in May 2014 where he had an 
“exchange of views with ministers on the ongoing situation in Ukraine and the work of 
the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM)”54 is an unprecedented meeting in the 
EU-OSCE history, testifying to the sense of urgency.  
 
As Nils Van Willigen underlines, there is also a dense cross-representation and 
interactions on the working level: annual meetings of EU and OSCE Secretariat 
officials, participation of OSCE staff in different formats and informal EU committee 
meetings and working groups. 55  Nevertheless, these contacts are rather of a 
technical nature. In the words of an EU official, for instance, the Council’s Working 
Party on the OSCE and the Council of Europe gatherings are empty of substance.56 
 
Where and how does the EU Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna 
fit? One entire section out of three (the two other sections being the UN and 
Administrative sections) at the Delegation is dealing with OSCE matters. Until 2012 the 
Delegation had one Head of EU Delegation, Ambassador Zanathy. However, the 
events in Ukraine somehow coincided with the arrival of reinforcement, Ambassador 
and EU Permanent Representative to the OSCE, Thierry Béchet. In addition, in 2016, 
the section’s staff consists of 6 EU officials or seconded national staff, out if which one 
Junior Professional in Delegation policy officer. Given that the resources the 
Delegation has at its disposal are rather limited, the OSCE section usually has 4-5 
interns whose role very often is to support the entire EU drafting process, that is, the 
                                                 
52 Van Willigen, op.cit., p. 144. 
53 European Commission, “Meeting with OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier”, Brussels, 
10 April, 2013, retrieved 20/04/15, http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/fule/ 
headlines/news/2013/04/20130410_en.htm. 
54 European Union, Foreign Affairs Council, Background, 12 May 2014, Brussels. 
55 Van Willigen, op.cit., p. 135. 
56 Interview 4, op.cit. 
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drafting of the EU statements for different weekly sessions. Unlike other participating 
States, the EU representation also disposes of its own EU office at the OSCE premises 
at the Hofburg, which enables it not only to better perform its coordination and 
administrative functions, but also to strengthen its outreach through presence and 
diplomatic activism, for instance when holding the weekly EU political dialogues with 
different groups of EU partner countries, including Russia. 
 
The year 2014 could be understood as a critical moment, when the strategic 
relationship between the EU and the OSCE has started to gradually transform, which 
has manifested its bearing on the EU action within and towards the OSCE. It is 
noteworthy that the EU was relatively slow realising the importance of the OSCE and 
the potential irreplaceable role it can play in the crisis context.57 The conflict brought 
‘more OSCE’ on the EU’s agenda, in particular, the extra-budgetary financing of the 
OSCE, instruments of crisis response, management and conflict resolution, which 
have shown their practical value when the EU was unable to directly use its crisis 
management toolbox. 58 The Union has visibly stepped up its efforts in the OSCE 
Permanent Council since 2014, as Table 1 shows. The average number of EU 
statements per plenary session has grown considerably, particularly when it comes to 
the number of those related to the conflict in Ukraine. Thus, there was almost no 
single plenary session of the OSCE PC since 2014 where the EU has not delivered at 
least one statement on ‘Russia’s Ongoing Aggression against Ukraine and Violations 
of OSCE Principles and Commitments’ or on other current issues linked to the 
conflict.59  
                                                 
57 Interview 7, op.cit. 
58 Interview 1, op.cit. 
59 Delegation of the European Union to the International Organisations in Vienna, OSCE and 
EU, EU statements in the OSCE, retrieved 1/05/15, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ 
delegations/vienna/eu_osce/eu_statements_osce_meetings/index_en.htm. 
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Table 1: EU statements in the OSCE Permanent Council (2014 – March 2016) 
Year No. of 
plenary 
sessions 
No. of 
statements 
No. of EU 
statements 
on Ukraine 
Average per session 
(statements on 
Ukraine/sessions) 
Ratio (EU state-
ments/EU state-
ments on Ukraine) 
2014 47 198 64 1,36 32,32% 
2015 51 216 80 1,57 37,03% 
2016* 7 28 1260 1,74 42,86% 
Source: Report EU engagement with other European regional organizations, Large-Scale FP7 Collaborative Project 
GA No. 320000, FRAME (forthcoming 2016), p. 186. 
* Data collected up till 3 March 2016 
 
The increased activism of the EU Delegation, strengthened material and financial 
support to the OSCE SMM, indicate an amplified interest and engagement, visibility 
and involvement in the efforts to tackle the Ukrainian crisis on the side of the EU. Yet, 
a clear evidence of a casual relation between an increased formal activity and the 
EU’s ability to actually influence the outcomes of the conflict resolution would be 
hard to establish or prove, given the complexity of the subject studied. 
 
EU effectiveness in the OSCE since Maidan  
 
As already mentioned, out of 57 OSCE participating States, the EU with its 28 member 
states and other, frequently aligned states (that is, the so-called ‘like-minded’ or 
‘candidate countries and potential candidates61) represent a major bloc in the 
OSCE, implying an “opportunity to influence the OSCE agenda”62 and course of 
action. One the other hand, such a big bloc of countries, mostly situated to the 
‘West of Vienna’, has the potential to trigger bloc dynamics, generating resistance. 
Furthermore, even though the EU’s aggregate financial commitment63 has relatively 
decreased since 2000s, the EU’s share in funding is still majoritarian. Particularly, in the 
case of setting up the OSCE SMM and sustainability of its deployment, the EU through 
its extra-budgetary financing, significant staff secondments and material donations, 
plays a key-enabling role. Nevertheless, the consensus rule that the OSCE universally 
                                                 
60 This includes the “EU Statement in Response to Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Foreign Minister of 
Germany” given the priority position it attributed to Ukraine in the statement and the extent 
of Ukraine related content as well as “Interpretative Statement under Paragraph IV.1 (A) 6 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE” on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers 
to two Russian checkpoints on the Ukrainian- Russian State border.  
61 Before each OSCE Permanent Council, the final version of the EU statements is sent to a list 
of friendly countries that can decide to align themselves with a given statement and thus, the 
EU statement finishes with and ‘alignment paragraph’. These agreed list of countries include 
Turkey, FYROM, Montenegro, Iceland, Serbia, Albania, BiH, Liechtenstein, Norway, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Andorra and San Marino. 
62 Van Willigen, op.cit., p. 136. 
63 The EU is only able to contribute to the extra-budgetary funding of different OSCE field 
activities and projects, including the SMM in Ukraine, whilst the EU Member States contribute 
to the so-called OSCE Unified Budget (approximately 65%). See N. van Willigen, op.cit., p. 142. 
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applies has to be taken into account and, thus, any country’s disapproval is enough 
to block more or less any important decision. This specific quality of the OSCE is its 
strength but at the same time its Achilles’ heel. 
 
Looking at the EU’s effectiveness in the OSCE, Van Willigen distinguishes EU internal 
and external effectiveness, that is, the EU’s ability to achieve goals in the OSCE.64 In 
this regard, internal effectiveness de facto refers to an improving capacity of the EU 
Delegation to successfully implement the Lisbon Treaty internally, that is, to function 
efficiently in coordinating EU member states, deliver upon its tasks and exercise its 
enhanced role of EU external representation. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, 
the EU’s overall effectiveness has improved. Nonetheless, at the same time, it can be 
limited by the ‘lowest common denominator approach’ when negotiating EU 
positions internally and consequently, by the lack of flexibility when interacting with 
other OSCE participating States.  
 
The internal effectiveness is also closely interlinked and has its implications for EU 
actorness within the OSCE, which in turn might have an impact on external 
effectiveness, that is, the ability to achieve its goal per se. When it comes to external 
effectiveness in a crisis situation, it is rather the ability of the EU to shape and 
influence the processes and decisions in line with its interests. Indeed, this category 
depends very much on the definition of EU objectives, which are not always clear 
and subject to change over time.  
 
Indeed, the EU’s objectives, and thus its strategy, in the OSCE are not clear. Are the 
EU objectives the ones the Union declares in the OSCE Permanent Council each year 
or the goals that form the fabric of the ESS and the EU Global Strategy,65 or both? 
Although those two layers of sets of goals are not mutually exclusive, the lack of a 
strategy influences the EU’s coherence and, as the past OSCE MCs showed, there is 
a clear tension between the EU objectives in different domains (for instance 
between ‘strengthening of human dimension commitments’ and ‘closer 
cooperation with the EU’s Eastern Neighbours and solving of protracted conflicts’). 66 
 
While a comprehensive EU strategy in the OSCE is missing, a concrete impact of the 
EU Global Strategy’s ambitions is still to be seen in the Vienna context. On the one 
                                                 
64 Van Willigen, op.cit., pp. 136-153. 
65  EEAS, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, EEAS, June 2016, retrieved 15/06/2016, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. 
66 Interview 6, op.cit. 
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had the EU plays undeniably an enabling role in relation to the OSCE and its field 
missions and projects. On the other hand, its “instrumental use of the OSCE”67 limits its 
overall effectiveness as well as effectiveness of the OSCE as a platform for 
comprehensive security cooperation and strategic dialogue.68 
 
EU in support of the OSCE crisis response: a perfect match? 
 
The EU objectives that could help establish the level of EU external effectiveness are 
a priori reflected in the relevant EU statements, internal EU documents and informally, 
discussed among EU Heads of Missions. The EU from the very beginning of the 
Ukrainian crisis insisted on a significant engagement of the OSCE in Ukraine, ensuring 
the respect of international law, and the restoration of a constructive dialogue 
between Russia and Ukraine. As the events developed and crisis escalated through 
2014 and beyond, the EU continued to reiterate the need to ensure successful 
presidential elections in Ukraine, to fully implement the Geneva Joint Statement69 of 
representatives of the EU, the US, Ukraine and the Russia as well as the need to 
extend the SMM’s mandate, while supporting the efforts of the Trilateral Contact 
Group. 70  Subsequently, towards the end of 2014, the EU insisted on a swift 
implementation of the Minsk Protocol, the Memorandum and the UN Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, an unhindered access of investigators to the MH17 
crash sites, improved OSCE monitoring of the Russian-Ukrainian international border 
as well as a timely and relevant expansion of the SMM’s mandate.71 
 
Another main concern was the humanitarian situation and the violation of human 
rights in Eastern Ukraine as well as in Crimea and, consequently, the facilitation by all 
parties of EU humanitarian aid distribution. In the run up to the OSCE MC in Basel, the 
EU became seriously concerned by ceasefire violations and efforts to destabilise the 
situation in Ukraine by the pro-Russian separatists as well as the deteriorating human 
rights situation in the areas controlled by armed separatist groups, whilst the Protocol 
and Memorandum have fallen short of a full implementation. Moreover, the OSCE’s 
                                                 
67 Van Willigen, op.cit., p. 149. 
68 Ibid. 
69  European Union, United States, Ukraine & Russian Federation “Geneva Statement on 
Ukraine” 140417/01, Geneva, 17 April 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/ 
140417_01_en.pdf, retrieved 2/06/ 2016. 
70 The Contact Group consists of Russian and Ukrainian representatives and the OSCE’s CiO 
(that is, the Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Ambassador 
Heidi Tagliavini). 
71 European Union, “EU Statement on the Violation of OSCE Principles and Commitments by 
the Russian Federation and the Situation in Ukraine”, PC.DEL/1240/14, OSCE Permanent 
Council No 1021, Vienna, 31 October 2014. 
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potential in terms of UNSCR 1325 implementation has been persistently blocked by 
the Russian side and referred to the UN level, despite the principles of regional 
subsidiarity, as stated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.72 
 
In its last 2014 and 2015 statements and as the situation in Ukraine has not 
fundamentally changed, the Union again strongly supported the strengthening of 
the SMM and its unlimited and safe access, resumption of consultations and the work 
of the Trilateral Contact Group, permanent monitoring of the Russian-Ukrainian state 
border by the OSCE73. Moreover, the EU stressed the OSCE’s role in facilitating a 
national dialogue in Ukraine, which would help to consolidate Ukraine’s internal 
cohesion and unity. Lastly, the Union expressed its great interest to work closely with 
the 2015 Serbian CiO on the resolution of the conflict.74 Yet, what out of this list has 
been achieved so far? 
 
The OSCE, with a ‘green light’ from all its participating States, has managed to 
engage in the conflict resolution on several different tracks, such as initiatives of the 
CiO and Secretary General of the OSCE, OSCE SMM and the Observer Mission at the 
Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk or other OSCE institutions’ initiatives to 
stabilise the situation in Eastern Ukraine. Since November 2013, the OSCE 
Representative on Freedom of the Media has “monitored the situation in Ukraine 
closely, bringing attention to grave violations of media freedom, in particular 
regarding journalists’ safety and restrictions to media plurality”.75 During 2014, the 
Swiss CiO has actively engaged in the conflict on the highest, presidential and 
ministerial levels in view of a diplomatic solution to the conflict.  
 
Regarding the humanitarian situation, and especially that of national minority 
groups, has started to deteriorate, the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities stepped in the battleground over language and identity, issuing public 
statements on the importance of a balanced language policy and spoke out about 
the rights of national minority communities, in particular the Crimean Tatars.76 The 
two OSCE autonomous institutions mentioned were joined by the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, upon Ukraine’s request, in order to 
                                                 
72 Interview 8, US official, 18 April 2016, Brussels.  
73 European Union, “EU Statement on the Violation of OSCE Principles and Commitments by 
the Russian Federation and the Situation in Ukraine”, PC.DEL/1480/14, OSCE Permanent 
Council Nr 1031, Vienna, 18 December 2014. 
74 Ibid. 
75 OSCE, “OSCE Responds to Crisis in & around Ukraine”, 23 April 2015, retrieved 1/05/15, 
http://www.osce.org/ukrainemonitoring. 
76 Ibid. 
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monitor and report on the overall situation of human right in the affected parts of the 
country, including gender and displacement issues.  
 
Finally, on 21 March 2014, all 57 OSCE participating States agreed to send a SMM to 
Ukraine, which already 24 hours after the decision started gathering “information 
and provides impartial facts-based reports on the security situation on the ground 
and establishes contacts and facilitates dialogue to reduce tensions”.77 A team of 
“15 international experts to Ukraine as part of a National Dialogue Project, run by the 
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine”78 and two more missions were deployed in 
Ukraine: an Election Observation Mission and an Observer Mission at the Russian 
checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk on the border with Ukraine (July 2014).  
 
Devoting its resources and becoming de facto the main sponsor, the EU enabled the 
implementation of the decisions on the SMM. However, it is also clear that the EU 
goals could have not been reached on the political level without the involvement of 
certain OSCE participating States, including individual EU member states. There can 
be no mention of EU goal achievement without taking into account the important 
‘synergies’ with the actions taken by its member states in narrower negotiation 
formats in support of the shared EU goals as outlined in this section.  
 
EU actorness in the OSCE: illusion or meaningful ‘actor in the making’? 
 
Having considered the EU’s ability to (indirectly) influence or shape the outcomes of 
the OSCE crisis response, this section aims to go more into detail and to shed light on 
the four criteria of EU actorness, including their relation to EU effectiveness in the 
OSCE. The EU’s interest in the OSCE, due to the crisis, has undoubtedly grown, both 
on declaratory and operational levels.  
 
Yet, according to the former Head of EU Delegation Lars-Erik Lundin, the 
implementation of the relevant Lisbon Treaty provisions is rather complicated in the 
Vienna context.79 Thus, the limits to EU actorness ought to be more observable and 
identifiable. The fact that the US has not been very visible created a certain 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 L.-E. Lundin, “The European Union, the IAEA and WMD Non-Proliferation: Unity of Approach 
and Continuity of Action”, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers, no. 9, 
2012, p. 4. 
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leadership vacuum inside the OSCE, leaving the EU “on the opposite side of the 
political fence from Russia and its shifting coalition of followers”.80  
 
Recognition  
 
The recognition of the EU represented by its Delegation has been a peculiar and 
delicate issue. The European Community has been present and played a vital role 
within the CSCE/OSCE from the very beginning and is a signatory of the key 
documents (1975 Helsinki Final Act, 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 1999 
Charter for European Security). Politically, the Union has been recognised as an 
actor within the OSCE. Nevertheless, it has no formal status per se. 
 
Therefore, as the EU Delegation has no position in the OSCE, the practical 
arrangement is that the EU always teams up with the rotating EU Presidency; known 
as ‘EUPRES team’, and, its extra seat and nameplate rotate accordingly. This 
adjustment is reflected in the 2006 OSCE Rules of Procedure81. With regard to the 
speaking rights, in the formal meetings, it is always the EU Presidency state that is 
given the floor first by the Chairperson, immediately passing the floor to the EU 
representative who delivers a majority of EU statements. The exception in this case 
are statements on behalf on the member states of the EU dealing with the issue of 
the OSCE Unified Budget (to which only EU member states contribute), which are 
read out by the EU Presidency representative. In contrast, the informal meetings are 
less strict and EU representatives can speak freely, usually on the basis of negotiated 
and agreed EU lines-to-take (LTTs). When it comes to formal recognition by its own 
member states, since the adoption and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the role 
of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has been gradually accepted, while 
keeping a certain domaine reservé for the rotating Presidency, for instance 
budgetary issues.  
 
As the implementation of the Treaty in terms of EU external representation has not 
been fully achieved in the OSCE, this leaves also some space for the rotating 
Presidency, not only because member states are basically used to it, but also it is a 
matter of national prestige of a presiding state to divide the roles within the ‘EUPRES’ 
team. For instance, during the Lithuania Presidency in 2013, the Presidency 
permanent representation has retained the chairing of the so-called EU drafting 
meeting of the Deputies Heads of Missions. This practical arrangement was 
                                                 
80 Van Ham., op.cit., p. 143. 
81  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Rules of Procedure of the 
Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, op.cit., pp. 8, 10. 
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acceptable for the EU Delegation, since it was lacking the necessary capacity at 
that period of time. The situation, however, changed with the following Greek 
Presidency, when the EU Delegation hired a policy officer and permanently took 
over the EU drafting sessions82. This example illustrates the general acceptance of the 
EU Delegation by the EU member states in its leading role in line with the Lisbon 
Treaty provisions and with what is realistically possible within the OSCE. 
 
Yet, the point raised by Gehring, Oberthür and Mühleck concerning informal 
recognition seems to apply also to the OSCE context: the fact that the EU is not 
formally recognised is not decisive for its position in the Organisation.83 What does 
matter are the Union’s action capabilities relevant to the work of the OSCE. These 
relevant capabilities stem partially from the overlap in terms of goals between the EU 
and the OSCE, that is, EU engagement in the Balkans, the South Caucasus and 
Eastern Europe as well as its thematic expertise.84 Additionally, the EU and its member 
states are the “major source of extra-budgetary funding of OSCE activities in the 
field”.85 
 
In case of the OSCE’s SMM in Ukraine, the EU and its member states have also been 
the major donors in financial as well as material terms, including approximately two 
thirds of the SMM’s seconded staff. Financially, in 2014 the EU has contributed 7 
million Euro and in 2015, it will be at least 5 million Euro.86 In this regard, the EU’s 
contribution is indispensable for the SMM in Ukraine to operate and continue to exist, 
which in turns strengthens the EU’s participation in the OSCE response due to the 
SMM’s irreplaceable role as monitoring, early warning and de-escalation toolbox on 
the ground. It can be noted that irrespective of its formal status, the other major 
players have accepted the EU as a relevant actor. 
 
On the other hand, when considering another major player involved, Russia, it is 
clear that there is also a tendency to instrumentalise the EU’s ambiguous position. In 
practice, this means that Russia from time to time contests the EU’s its right to speak 
on certain issues, while at the same time, it stresses the Russian willingness to consider 
                                                 
82 Interview 3, op.cit. 
83 Gehring, Oberthür & Mühleck, op.cit., pp. 849-865. 
84 OSCE, “The European Union”, retrieved 21/04/15, http://www.osce.org/networks/111481. 
85 According to Kirchner, until 2008, the EU member states have paid for around 70% of the 
OSCE filed missions’ annual budget. Kirchner, op.cit., p.19. 
86 Interview 2, op.cit., Interview 3, op.cit. 
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an upgrade of the EU’s status as long as the same could be applied to other 
regional groupings such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.87 
 
Another example of the interactions between Russia and the EU are the latter’s 
weekly Political Dialogues. The Russian officials regularly attend those meetings but 
the real discussion is very limited, that is, most of the time an exchange of information 
about prepared statements or other practicalities. It should be noted in this regard 
that the bilateral meetings between Russia and major EU member states’ officials are 
held weekly. Hence, the EU is not always the interface for non-EU countries when 
they want to speak to the 28 EU member states and vice versa. 
 
When it comes to the weekly plenary sessions of the OSCE PC and the Ukrainian crisis 
debate, nothing has changed in the dynamics between the EU and Russia in this 
setting.88 In spite of the EU’s efforts of constructive ‘engagement and containment’89 
of Russia, the overall relations remain tense since Russia denies any role in the conflict 
‘in and around Ukraine’. Therefore, there is no meeting of minds in the OSCE plenary 
sessions and the EU uses it to measure the overall temperature in the OSCE, in the 
words of an EU official.90 In fact, comparing to the experience from the 1990s, the EU 
‘bloc approach’ has allegedly contributed to the negative trend of pre-prepared 
statements, which in turn contributed to the conversion of the Permanent Council 
into a platform for monologues, instead of dialogues.91 
 
Last but not least, as some of the non-EU diplomats attending the plenary sessions 
suggested, the participating States outside the ‘EU club’ are more interested in the 
opinions of influential EU member states rather than the EU’s ‘one voice’, since they 
know it is most probably the ‘least common denominator’ position.92 In this regard, 
what works in favour of the EU’s recognition and relevance is the increase in its 
flexibility – a message that in fact has been passed to the EU representatives by 
some of its partners and chairpersons of different committees.93 
 
                                                 
87 OSCE, Statement by Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of The Russian Federation, 
at the Nineteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, http://MC.DEL/21/12, Dublin, 6 
December 2012, retrieved 28/04/15, http://www.osce.org/mc/97943?download=true. 
88 Interview 1, op.cit., Interview 2, op.cit., Interview 7, op.cit. 
89 Interview 7, op.cit. 
90 Interview 3, op.cit. 
91 Interview 6, op.cit. 
92 Interview 6, op.cit; Interview 7, op.cit. 
93 Interview 7, op.cit. 
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The de facto recognition of the EU in the Ukrainian crisis context by Russia and its 
allies is ambiguous and questionable. Still, even though the EU holds no formal status 
in the OSCE, in the Ukrainian crisis context it matters by virtue of its enabling 
resources. Hence, it is an actor recognised as relevant due to its action capabilities, 
especially in relation to the OSCE SMM.  
 
All in all, it can be argued that the Union’s position has been improved, at least 
informally, but also based on the strategy it has formulated and pursued vis-à-vis 
Russia. In this sense, the overall recognition of the EU as a relevant actor has created 
a rather favourable than constraining environment for the EU Delegation to have its 
say in the OSCE crisis response. 
 
Authority 
 
The EU’s authority in the OSCE is a priori a question of its formal-legal competences.94 
Indeed, the dispersal of competences within the EU “makes cooperation an intricate 
matter, especially since conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation thrives on 
a mixture of economic, financial and diplomatic tools, which often-times find 
themselves in different hands within EU institutions”.95 
 
Considering these competences further, the Ukrainian crisis falls into the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) area of EU foreign policy, which implies a specific 
type of a competence the Union can claim. Moreover, Declaration No. 14, 
attached to the Treaty, also excludes pre-emption in the CFSP field since the 
provisions on CFSP do not affect the power of member states in conducting their 
foreign policy”.96 In legal terms, “the nature of the Union’s competence in the field of 
CFSP is not well defined, however, and might be best categorised as a kind of ‘sui 
generis’ competence or shared competence without pre-emption”.97 
 
Applied to the Ukrainian crisis, legally both the EU and its member states can act. 
Hence, it is a question of coordination, strategy and tactics, stemming from 
coherence of preferences and recognition. The fact that the EU has not an exclusive 
                                                 
94 Groenleer & Van Schaik, op.cit., p. 974. 
95 Van Ham, op.cit., p. 145. 
96 J. Wouters, D. Coppens, & B. De Meester, “The European Union’s External Relations after the 
Lisbon Treaty”, in Griller, Stefan & Jacques Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty; EU Constitutionalism 
without a Constitutional Treaty?, Vienna, Springer, 2008, p. 162. 
97 Ibid., p. 169. 
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competence does not automatically entail its ineffectiveness98 or impossibility to act 
deliberately as a unitary actor.  
 
Also, the fact that the EU has been interacting both with Russia and Ukraine, 
demonstrates that the Union is a regional player and stakeholder as well, and 
necessitates and legitimised EU foreign policy involvement on different levels and in 
different ways. However, the EU is not directly involved in dealing with Russia in 
conflict resolution and negotiations – these are rather single European states, France 
and Germany – within the ‘Normandy format’. Hence, in addition to the EU 
statements relevant to the conflict, France and Germany almost always take the 
floor in the OSCE PC, sometimes echoed by the United Kingdom and Spain as well. 
 
All things considered, when it comes to the authority criterion and its implications for 
the EU’s actorness, the main point to be made is that what the EU can do 
independently in Vienna is rather limited. Negotiations are part of a bigger picture 
that includes several big players, different capitals, the ‘Normandy format’ and the 
HR/VP. In fact, it can be argued inversely that the EU’s potential effectiveness in this 
conflict in this case limits its authority to deal with it, while other actors by the virtue of 
their capabilities have taken the leadership in determining the strategic direction. 
 
Cohesion  
 
Considering the cohesion of the EU in the OSCE framework when dealing with the 
Ukrainian crisis, three different groups among EU member states can be 
distinguished.99 First, a group of member states that strongly support a principled and 
normative stance towards Russia, including countries like Poland, the Czech Republic 
or the Baltic States. The second group took a kind of ‘appeasement’ approach 
towards Russia in dealing with the conflict, including Germany and other EU 
countries with strong economic ties with Russia. Finally, there is a ‘middle ground’ 
group of EU member states that has no strong position.  
 
Specific to the OSCE context and Russian policy within this framework in recent years 
is that the EU member states share the view that at the present times it is important to 
safeguard and uphold the existing commitments. Thus, the EU member states’ basic 
normative views on Russian activities in and around Eastern Ukraine were rather 
converging. Whilst the EU was able to foster consensus on every EU statement on the 
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conflict, some powerful EU member states have also ‘stepped in’ in order to assume 
a balanced leadership. 
 
The EU positions are in practice coordinated in Vienna, among EU member states 
(horizontal coordination), with Brussels from time to time contributing with some 
inputs or even a relevant EU Delegation if the subject deals with the country or 
region where it is situated. Usually, the EU officials in charge of coordination are quite 
flexible and pragmatic about what comes from Brussels, but in the case of the 
Ukrainian crisis, the coordination with the Headquarters is significant. The importance 
of vertical coordination is significant.  
 
There was a common understanding among the 28 Ambassadors that in a hot issue 
like the ‘conflict in and around Ukraine’, it is plausible that the EU ‘speaks with one 
voice’ and what is said in Vienna has to be in line with what is happening on higher 
levels.100 Also, ‘speaking with one voice’ in the Ukrainian crisis in the OSCE framework 
has been an important common understanding, fuelled by the fact that the Russian 
side traditionally favours splits among the EU member states. Indeed, the EU drafting 
and coordination processes are time-consuming and even though the EU 
Delegation now has full responsibility of it, the member states are in full control of it. In 
practice, the EU Delegation liaises closely with the EU chefs de file, member states 
diplomats who are in charge of a particular domain and provide either an impetus 
for an EU common position and/or provide a first draft of EU statements.  
 
The EU coordination process is lengthy and inward looking. The proposal of possible 
EU statements is presented to the EU Heads of Missions on Monday. After the 
Ambassadors give their green light for the proposed topics, or they initiate 
themselves new ones, the relevant chefs de file provide drafts and the EU Delegation 
takes the ownership of the coordination. First drafts are circulated among EU 
                                                 
100 Based on the information from Interview 2, an example that could be cited in this sense is 
that of the maximum number (ceiling) of the OSCE’s SMM in Ukraine staff. The subject was 
debated in Vienna for some time, on the occasion of the renewal of the mandate of the 
mission. The consensus reached was a ceiling of 500 SMM members, with the possibility of an 
increase as needed. In the meantime, and before this consensus was formally sealed, there 
was a bilateral meeting between Chancellor Merkel and President Putin, who agreed on the 
ceiling of up to 1,000 personnel that the SMM could have. Consequently, this high-level 
decision had to be flexibly accepted in Vienna and reflected in the formal documents. See 
for instance: Business Standard, “OSCE doubles Ukraine observer mission to 1,000”, Vienna, 13 
March 2015, retrieved 22/04/15, http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/osce-
doubles-ukraine-observer-mission-to-1-000-115031300019_1.html. 
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member states as well as in Brussels based services101 that can add their proposals. 
Proposals are then reflected and second drafts are uploaded on Agora, the internal 
communication platform, just before the drafting session of the EU Deputies on 
Wednesday afternoon. It is at this point where the EU statements are also shared with 
the group of ‘alignment countries’, but also with strategic partners such as the US 
and with Russia.102 Finally, the EU Heads of Mission meet early on Thursday morning to 
approve the final drafts of the negotiated positions that are to be delivered in the 
OSCE PC right after. This final step is not a mere formality, some statements are left 
open by the Deputies for the Ambassadors to agree on difficult issues, which can be 
of substantive nature or can relate to the competence issue. 
 
The content and ambition of past EU statements on the ‘conflict in and around 
Ukraine’ gives a good idea of the cohesion. Even though all the relevant statements 
were agreed in the end, there are limits to EU unity, for instance when the Union 
issued, as a final compromise with one opposing member state, interpretative 
statements in 2014 and 2015103 on the mandate of the SMM.  
 
The EU coordination procedure, which de facto lasts 4 days per week and requires 
at least 2 EU officials, illustrates how heavy the EU coordination is, but also what 
implications it has for the EU’s flexibility and effectiveness once confronted with other 
opinions. In other words, the ability of the EU to ‘speak with one voice’ – to present 
itself as a unitary actor in a first round of formal exchange – is at the ‘higher level of 
actorness’ limited by the fact that it cannot engage in a subsequent dialogue 
straightforwardly.104 Such a situation is paradoxical and somehow contradicting the 
EU’s declaratory policy. 
 
                                                 
101 There were efforts to have inputs from Brussels at an earlier stage of the EU drafting process 
in order to influence it more effectively. However, due to time constraints, this idea works in 
practice only occasionally, Ukraine being a relevant case in point.  
102 It is only the US that reciprocally shares its statements that are to be delivered on the next 
day. Whilst Russia does not have the habit of reciprocating this gesture and sharing its 
statements with the EU, Russian officials usually contact the EU Delegation staff in case final 
drafts of the EU statements for some reason have not reached them yet. 
103 European Union, “Interpretative Statement under Paragraph IV.1 (A)6 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe”, 
http://PC.DEL/328/15, OSCE Permanent Council Nr 1044 Vienna, 12 March 2015; European 
Union, “Interpretative Statement under Paragraph IV.1 (A)6 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe”, http://PC.DEL/1486/14, OSCE 
Permanent Council Nr 1031 Vienna, 18 December 2014, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna/documents/eu_osce/ 
permanent_council/2015/pc_1044_eu_on_extension_of_smm_ukraine.pdf, retrieved 
3/08/2016. 
104 Van Willigen, op.cit., pp. 136-152. 
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Another paradox is that the EU spends a great amount of time on the coordination 
of common positions, which in turn increases a reaction of its opposition. But at that 
stage, the EU becomes also inflexible. In the words of an EEAS official, if there is a 
debate, the EU either remains silent, or limits itself to messages of a strictly factual 
character. 105  In any case, for their part, the EU Ambassadors are generally not 
enthusiastic to see the EU asking for the floor if a proper debate starts in the OSCE 
PC.106 
 
In terms of effectiveness, there are clearly constraining aspects of the EU operating 
on the basis of coordinated positions. A strongly centralised coordination and 
narrowly defined EU mandate are limits to EU effectiveness, making EU unity 
insufficient to achieve its objectives alone. 
 
Autonomy 
 
The fourth criterion of EU actorness is the autonomy of the EU Delegation in the OSCE 
framework, when it acts in line with the discretionary powers it has been 
delegated.107 In this regard, the CFSP nature of the Ukrainian crisis fosters a particular 
situation when considering EU autonomy in the OSCE. What has to be firstly taken 
into account − in line with a multi-faceted and multi-level nature of the EU as an 
entity − is that it is the HR/VP that represents the EU in the CFSP field. However, it is the 
European Council that gives the Union an overall strategic guidance for its foreign 
policy. The EU member states are still very much in charge of the EU foreign policy 
agenda, which sometimes results in a confused picture of a complicated jigsaw. 
 
In the OSCE context, when it comes to agenda setting, the EU has de facto little 
autonomy. First, each CiO has its own agenda for an entire year and for that the EU 
automatically prepares a common position. Second, the EU can propose any 
current issue, but it is always upon approval of the EU Heads of Missions that the EU 
Delegation and chefs de file can initiate the drafting.  
 
Indeed, it should be noted that informal links, personal relations between the officials 
could be an important factor when it comes to agenda setting and agenda 
influencing since the diplomats concerned know each other very well and interact 
very frequently. The EU officials have in fact many informal interfaces to foster their 
autonomy in terms of agenda influencing when it comes to the EU’s vital issues. This 
                                                 
105 Interview 3, op.cit. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Groenleer & Van Schaik, op.cit., p. 974. 
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sociological aspect plays a more significant role than it could seem and would 
undoubtedly constitute an interesting subject of further study. 
 
Where the EU has theoretically an advantage is its drafting activity of different 
internal documents that are circulated and discussed in the EU Heads of Missions 
meetings – non-papers, food-for-thought drafts, LTTs in different informal meetings, 
and other internal working documents such as the EU’s OSCE mid-term, long-term 
priorities or Helsinki+40 discussion papers. Hence, the EU Delegation has the 
opportunity and a recognised right of initiative, which it uses on a regular basis, 
based on the expertise of its officials and their access to key information on different 
topics.  
 
Nevertheless, in the case of the Ukrainian crisis, France and Germany, by virtue of 
their involvement in the ‘Normandy format’, have had better access to information 
and negotiations held outside the OSCE framework. Germany, in particular, “saw the 
Organisation as an important opportunity”.108 In this regard, the EU, being pragmatic, 
closely liaises and teams up with the Delegations of the two EU member states in 
preparing common positions and coordinating the tactics within the OSCE.  
 
In the same vein, considering the mandate of the EU Delegation within the OSCE, 
and especially when it comes to Ukraine, the EU’s freedom of action is firstly 
constrained by the development on higher political levels. Thus, the EU officials often 
find themselves in a more passive position and are limited to listen109 instead of 
grasping an opportunity to really interact with their counterparts, for instance, when 
the Union is invited to relevant informal meetings110 in a more focused format.  
 
Therefore, seen from the outside perspective, the meetings between the Swiss CiO 
and individual EU member states such as France, Germany or the UK, were more 
efficient for each side, since the CiO could really obtain concrete commitments from 
these participating States – unlike from the EU that cannot commit itself (and 
potentially, its member states) without a mandate111.  
 
                                                 
108 Kropatcheva, op.cit., p. 17. 
109 Interview 2, op.cit. 
110 Even though the EU often mentions those informal meetings dealing with the Ukrainian 
crisis in its statements, the Union did not participate for instance in the informal meeting 
discussing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones as the means of monitoring the 
ceasefire in Ukraine, UAVs’ role and deployment in UA. 
111 Interview 7, op.cit. 
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The EU is not regarded as a flexible partner for a (strategic) dialogue as it currently 
interacts with other actors in the OSCE. There have been even some proposals how 
to overcome this inflexibility, that is, when in the beginning the EU is able to deliver a 
very powerful statement, but is unable to properly react in a subsequent discussion. 
In the end, the EU’s strong initial messages are barely recalled. In this regard, for 
instance, one of the previous Chairs of the OSCE Human Dimension Committee has 
on several occasions even approached the EU officials suggesting alternatives to 
‘one voice’ tactic, which could be based on creating more synergies with EU 
member states when defending and negotiating EU positions.112 Such an approach 
would have the potential to streamline a dynamic within the OSCE, foster dialogue 
and possibly boost the EU’s ability to achieve its goals. A clear-cut separation from 
other state actors, “improving the EU’s formal autonomy and thus actorness does not 
necessarily lead to optimal outcomes”.113  
 
The assumption that the EU actorness-effectiveness relationship can be inversely 
proportional applies to the current crisis scenario, when the diplomatic engagement 
of single EU member states has contributed to the aggregate effectiveness of the 
‘EU bloc’. However, the question that remains open to further research in relation to 
the autonomy criterion is whether the involved EU states were in this context acting 
consciously as “‘European actors’ and upon commonly accepted ‘European values 
and norms’”, alternatively emanating from processes of learning and socialisation 
within the EU ‘club’ in Vienna.114 It could be argued that when negotiating with 
Russia, Germany has its own vital interests in mind, however, given the 
unprecedented degree of interdependence within the EU, it shall be also acting in 
the name of the EU and its interests. Hence, this vertical cohesion perspective may in 
fact imply that the leading EU member states may be acting as ‘European actors’ 
and in the common interest.  
 
Building on the analysis of the four criteria of EU actorness, which are rather internal 
factors, external opportunity structure needs to be taken into account as well when 
analysing EU actorness-effectiveness relationship. This is particularly important in a 
geographically close crisis context, in which the EU has its vital interests at stakes. 
 
External opportunity structure 
 
                                                 
112 Interview 2, op.cit. 
113 Groenleer & Van Schaik, op.cit., 974. 
114 Ibid., pp. 975-976. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 3/2016 
30 
There is a strong interest to consider external variables when studying EU actorness 
and effectiveness, as Delreux contends:  
[R]ecognition depends on the extent to which international institutions […] 
and external partners accept the EU as an actor; autonomy is conditional 
upon the external compellingness and cohesion to a large extent depends on 
the degree of politicization of the international negotiations.115 
 
On the systemic level, the geopolitical dimension has to be taken into account when 
evaluating the EU’s ability to pursue its goals, as a unitary actor. As Kropatcheva 
notes, this conflict goes even “beyond what the OSCE can do”116 in spite of its 
increased relevance, as Putin has “gradually inclined towards the balance-of-power 
approach”,117 which means a greater emphasis on military power, an area in which 
the EU has no competence. 
Another notable aspect touched upon in the literature, which can either weaken or 
strengthen the Union’s quest for a status is the level of politicisation.118 The more 
prominent persons are involved, the more difficult it is for the EU to act deliberately, 
as an autonomous and unitary actor. The ‘conflict in and around Ukraine’, and the 
involvement of Russia, is the most serious crisis of military nature in Europe since the 
Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. It is not “just another crisis, but the crisis, which may lead 
to the remaking of the European security order”.119 Different European states have 
different (vital) interests when it comes to both, Ukraine and Russia, including energy 
dependencies and strong economic ties,120 which make their involvement on the 
highest level simply a logical consequence. Some EU member states are more 
hawkish, some are rather dovish, but not all the actors genuinely concerned have 
the capacity or relevance to act. Hence, at the end of the day, it comes without 
surprise that “Merkel has been the West’s indisputable interlocutor with Putin”.121 
 
The main challenge is coordination and ensuring that one message is being passed, 
since ‘speaking with one voice’ becomes fairly more difficult and the EU cannot 
influence this that easily. This is once again reiterated in the case of the Ukrainian 
conflict. However, there are reasons to believe that there is indeed a high degree of 
                                                 
115  T. Delreux, “Revisiting EU actorness in environmental affairs”, paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the Nineteenth Annual Conference of the Council for European Studies, 
Boston, MA, 24 November 2014. 
116 Kropatcheva, op. cit., p. 18. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Groen & Niemann, op.cit., p. 1. 
119 Kropatcheva, op. cit., p. 16. 
120 Interview 5, op.cit. 
121  J. Dempsey, “Putin Is Merkel’s (and Europe’s) Biggest Security Challenge”, Carnegie 
Europe, 2014, retrieved 1/05/15, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57241. 
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coordination and communication at the highest level as the EU has taken a sensitive 
political decision not to be directly involved in the negotiations, mediation and 
conflict resolution.122 In the meantime, the value of the OSCE as an actor in Ukraine 
has increased significantly, “while the rest stayed unchanged”, meaning that the 
EU’s interest in the OSCE has grown only in this specific case.123 
 
Another aspect of the external opportunity structure is the acceptance of the EU as 
an actor by external partners, in this case Russia. It is not a secret that when it comes 
to the EU’s relations with Russia, the latter has always favoured to deal with different 
EU member states separately. In this case, the only possible way forward has proven 
to be on the highest level, direct dialogue with President Putin, the German 
Chancellor Merkel and the French President Holland. It was in this ‘Normandy format’ 
that the Minsk Agreements were crafted and sealed, while the OSCE is supposed to 
monitor and oversee their implementation. A similar involvement of actors applies to 
the existing Trilateral Contact Group, excluding the EU as it consists of the OSCE, 
Russia and Ukraine. The EU has remained highly committed or rather concerned, 
however, not directly involved.  
 
Finally, even on the local level, it should be kept in mind that the OSCE is “an 
organisation for cooperation in Europe, and its capacities depend on the readiness 
of its participating States for dialogue but also to use the OSCE”.124 The EU’s ability to 
act is hence in addition influenced by the willingness of the rest of the States present 
at the table, particularly Russia, whose policy towards the OSCE has oscillated 
between disengagement, disillusionment and ambivalence from 1999 onwards.125 
 
Generally, the EU and Russia have been pushing for distinctive agendas: the former 
for a value-based community, the latter for a community based on a shared interest 
in preserving peace in the OSCE region.126 Consensus as the ‘voting procedure’ thus 
a priori limits the EU’s potential as a major ‘bloc’ in the OSCE and also what the OSCE 
can achieve since every single State can block any initiative. The ideational structure 
in terms of the social context and perceptions127 seems to be also constraining the 
EU’s constructive involvement as an actor in the pursuit of its objectives. The 
                                                 
122 Interview 3, op.cit., Interview 4, op.cit., Interview 5, op.cit. 
123 Interview 3, op.cit. 
124 Kropatcheva, op. cit., p. 17. 
125 Ibid., 11-15. 
126 Kropatcheva, op. cit., p. 19. 
127  D.C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay”, 
International Security, vol. 25, no. 2, 2000, pp. 187-212. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 3/2016 
32 
narratives behind the Ukrainian crisis in Moscow and Brussels are diametrically 
different and there is no “meeting of minds”. 128  The EU’s normative identity, 
generated also by common positions vis-à-vis Russia, in particular in the current crisis 
context, does not allow it to act as flexibly as individual member states potentially 
can. Yet, Russia’s narrative, reflected in Putin’s propaganda is also that of an “anti-
Russian coup d’état [in Ukraine], sponsored by the West”.129 
 
What are the implications for the EU’s efforts as an autonomous actor in the context 
studied? As Groen and Niemann argue, “in terms of effectiveness it also matters 
whether the EU has devised a strategy that takes the external environment into 
account”130. Yet, whether the EU Delegation in Vienna has deliberately developed 
such a comprehensive strategy, giving it a clear direction when it comes to its goals 
and means towards their achievement, and adjusted to the new geostrategic 
environment is not easy to trace or prove, based on the materials studied. Rather, it 
can be argued that the EU team has been relatively pragmatic when closely 
coordinating with the member states that are engaged in conflict resolution, which is 
one aspect that favours the Union’s ability to achieve EU goals, overcoming some of 
the external constraints in synergy with its member states. For the rest, the external 
opportunity structure, given the urgency and prominence of the crisis, is arguably 
more restraining the EU’s international actorness as well as effectiveness.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The ‘conflict in and around Ukraine’ has been one of the major European security 
crises since the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Involving a revisionist, re-emerging Russia, 
the urgency of the crisis is unprecedented, given its potential to undermine the 
existing European security architecture, established through the Helsinki Process 
(1975) and since the end of the Cold War. On top of that, given the geographical 
proximity, close ties with Ukraine and difficult relations with Russia, the EU is one of the 
major stakeholders in this crisis. Paradoxically, the Union has not been directly 
involved in the regional crisis response and conflict settlement efforts. As it has 
become clear after the annexation of Crimea, the OSCE has been the only regional 
organisation in the position to act effectively towards the conflict resolution and to 
establish a meaningful presence on the ground, based on its comprehensive security 
toolbox.  
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Both the urgency of the situation, including a massive impact on the human rights 
situation in Ukraine, and the EU’s inability to take concrete steps have re-focused the 
EU’s interest on what the OSCE can do and how it can do it in the most convenient 
way, in terms of monitoring and upholding of human rights directly affected by the 
asymmetrical armed conflict.  
 
This paper analysed the link between EU actorness and effectiveness in the OSCE, 
where implementation of ‘Lisbon’ proves to be difficult, in the light of the Ukrainian 
crisis. It was argued that in this particular context, more EU actorness does not 
necessarily lead to a greater ability of the EU to influence the outcomes or achieve 
its goals. Considering the four criteria of EU actorness as well as the external 
opportunity structure, the EU has been paradoxically a more successful player when 
it acted in synergy or alongside with the bigger EU member states rather than as an 
autonomous actor. In other words, the EU, being pragmatic about its external 
representation, has successfully ‘traded its actorness for effectiveness’ in the 
Ukrainian crisis context. 
 
It was shown that in spite of importance of the crisis for the EU (demonstrated by its 
increased interest and practical contributions to the OSCE SMM), the EU’s ability to 
achieve autonomously its crisis-related goals in the OSCE is rather questionable and 
limited. Yet, in the situation when EU actorness in the OSCE was constrained internally 
by its constituent member states − the common, ‘European goals’ were better 
achieved. Certainly, this has been the case of the direct involvement of the 
Delegations of France and Germany in the OSCE framework, their commitment 
being in line with the high-level political and diplomatic track outside the OSCE. The 
close cooperation and co-ordination between the EU Delegation and the two 
member states’ delegations in defining common positions, strategy and tactics 
within the OSCE is another example. 
 
Importantly, elements of external opportunity structure have been touched upon at 
almost each important instance thorough this paper. This external context (on 
different levels of analysis) is of a particular importance in a crisis situation and 
indeed, it has an impact on what the EU can or cannot do, for instance when it 
comes to a direct involvement of the EU in crisis response and conflict management. 
 
Considering the EU actorness-effectiveness link, it should be firstly noted that the 
relevant Lisbon Treaty provisions have not been fully implemented in the OSCE. 
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However, the EU has gained a certain degree of informal recognition as a relevant 
actor involved in the OSCE crisis response, based on the support of its member states, 
its action capabilities and enabling contributions to the OSCE presence of which has 
been considered vital by the all OSCE participating States. Being perceived as a 
relevant actor has gained the EU invitations to most of the different informal meeting 
dealing with the crisis. But given the lack of authority, the role of the EU has been 
more passive, limited to listening and, hence, less effective in actively advancing its 
goals through focused dialogue. The EU’s actorness has proven to be unsustainable 
at a more advanced level of interaction with third actors. 
 
Considering the OSCE PC plenary format, the EU was able to internally develop a 
strategy of ‘containment and engagement’ towards Russia (reflecting the different 
EU member state preferences) and to pursue it in a united manner. On the other 
hand, the EU ‘speaking with one voice’ in the crisis context has had rather a 
symbolic value: once a common message is delivered, the EU loses its autonomy 
and flexibility to respond and pursue its objectives. Again, the EU’s internal set up and 
functioning favour its active engagement and maintaining of it actorness, that is, its 
functioning as an autonomous actor, at a different levels of exchanges with other 
actors. As a result, some EU member states stepped in (specifically, those politically 
engaged in the ‘Normandy format’) and were able to offer real commitments and 
to negotiate − as ‘European actors’ and in support of the ‘European interests’. 
 
To sum up, the main issues of effective EU presence in the OSCE in dealing with the 
Ukrainian crisis have been its lack of flexibility, highlighted by the lack of autonomy 
and authority. However, considering the concrete developments in the OSCE, the 
EU’s ability to achieve its objectives and to shape decisions was more important in 
‘synergies’ with leading EU member states. Thus, if the EU acts in a more pragmatic 
manner when it comes to its pursuit of a better status as an autonomous actor, it is 
still able to trade its actorness for more effectiveness in shaping the outcomes. The 
Union has been constantly adapting and de facto experimenting with its 
representation in an environment where the Lisbon Treaty has been difficult to fully 
implement. The EU has been more able to shape the OSCE crisis response when it 
adapted well to the constraints of the external opportunity structure, block 
dynamics, and responded to it in a pragmatic manner, together with its member 
states that took a discreet leadership. 
 
All things considered, more layers and constellations of EU actorness in connection 
with its goal achievement ability can be distinguished. At the same time, concepts 
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of EU actorness and effectiveness are organically linked to the contexts in which they 
are studied. This, on the one hand, gives them an important explanatory power of 
different circumstances and outcomes, which on the other hand, limits the power to 
draw general conclusions.  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that the crisis setting, where the EU is a stakeholder and 
where Russia as its major opponent is involved, generates resistance towards this sui 
generis ‘actor in the making’. The EU’s actorness in the OSCE crisis response context is 
clearly limited. Yet, this does not mean that the EU (and its member states) is unable 
to pursue ‘European objectives’ in a pragmatic manner, through practical 
arrangements, trading to some extent its status as an autonomous actor for a 
collective pursuit of concrete results. The changed circumstances in the OSCE 
highlight the need to define a more specific EU strategy in the OSCE, eventually 
based on the EU Global Strategy of 2016, involving more actively its member states, 
which better reflect the external limits to its effective presence.  
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